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PART I: INTRODUCTION 
“Viability marks the earliest point at which the State’s interest in 
fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on non-
therapeutic abortion.”1 This was the United States Supreme Court’s es-
sential holding in the 1973 landmark case of Roe v. Wade.2 In 1992 and 
again in 2007 the Supreme Court reaffirmed that essential holding in 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey and Gonzales v. Carhart.3 However, to 
date, thirteen states have enacted statutes that appear to challenge this 
decade-old ruling on its face.4 Starting in 2010 with Nebraska,5 states 
began enacting laws banning abortions beginning at twenty weeks ges-
tational age, a point in time that precedes fetal viability.6 States have 
                                                     
 
 1. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 835–36 (1992). 
 2. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973) (setting out the trimester framework 
under which the State can only prohibit nontherapeutic abortions after a fetus is viable), 
holding modified by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  
 3. Casey, 505 U.S. at 835–36; Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007).  
 4. See ALA. CODE § 26-23B-5 (West, Westlaw through Act 2014-191 of the 2014 
Regular Session); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2159 (West, Westlaw through the First Regular 
and First Special Session of the Fifty-first Legislature (2013)) (held unconstitutional by 
Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 905 (U.S. 2014)); 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1405 (West, Westlaw through end of 2013 Regular and First Ex. 
Session, including changes made by Ark. Code Rev. Comm. received through 1/1/2014, and 
emerg. eff. acts from 2014 Fiscal Sess.: 210); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-141 (West, Westlaw 
through Act 351 of the 2014 Regular Session); IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-505 (West, Westlaw 
through emergency effective legislation of the 2014 Second Regular Session of the 62nd Ida-
ho Legislature enacted as of March 26, 2014) (held unconstitutional by McCormack v. 
Hiedeman, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Idaho 2013)); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-1 (West, 
Westlaw through P.L.29 of the Second Regular Session of the 118th General Assembly (2014) 
with effective dates through March 13, 2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6724 (West, Westlaw 
through 2013 regular and special session) (banning abortions beginning at twenty-two weeks 
gestational age); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.30.1 (West, Westlaw through the 2013 Regu-
lar Session); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-3,106 (West, Westlaw through End of 2013 Regular 
Session); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-45.1 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2013 Regu-
lar Session of the General Assembly); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.1-05.3 (West, Westlaw 
through the 2013 Regular Session of the 63rd Legislative Assembly); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
63, § 1-745.5 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 23 (End) of the First Extraordinary Session of 
the 54th Legislature (2013)); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.044 (West, Westlaw 
through end of the 2013 Third Called Session of the 83rd Legislature). 
 5. Glenn Cohen & Sadath Sayeed, Fetal Pain, Abortion, Viability, and the Consti-
tution, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 235, 235 (2011). 
 6. ALA. CODE § 26-23B-5 (West, Westlaw through Act 2014-191 of the 2014 Regu-
lar Session); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2159 (West, Westlaw through the First Regular and 
First Special Session of the Fifty-first Legislature (2013) (held unconstitutional by Isaacson, 
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begun enacting these twenty-week bans based on “substantial medical 
evidence indicat[ing] that [an unborn child is] capable of [experiencing] 
pain” by twenty weeks after fertilization.7 
Although the purpose of these twenty-week bans may be compel-
ling, under current Supreme Court precedent the statutes are likely per 
se unconstitutional. Viability, as defined by the Court, is “the time at 
which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life 
outside the womb.”8 This critical point is flexible and differs from preg-
nancy to pregnancy,9 but many professionals today believe viability oc-
curs at roughly twenty-three or twenty-four weeks of pregnancy.10 It is 
currently undisputed that no fetus is viable at twenty weeks gestational 
                                                                                                                           
716 F.3d 1213); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1405 (West, Westlaw through end of 2013 Regular 
and First Ex. Session, including changes made by Ark. Code Rev. Comm. received through 
1/1/2014, and emerg. eff. acts from 2014 Fiscal Sess.: 210); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-141 (West, 
Westlaw through Act 351 of the 2014 Regular Session); IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-505 (West, 
Westlaw through emergency effective legislation of the 2014 Second Regular Session of the 
62nd Idaho Legislature enacted as of March 26, 2014) (held unconstitutional by McCormack, 
900 F. Supp. 2d 1128); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-1 (West, Westlaw through P.L.29 of the 
Second Regular Session of the 118th General Assembly (2014) with effective dates through 
March 13, 2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.30.1 (West, Westlaw through the 2013 Regu-
lar Session); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.  § 28-3,106 (West, Westlaw through End of 2013 Regular 
Session); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-45.1 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2013 Regu-
lar Session of the General Assembly); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.1-05.3 (West, Westlaw 
through the 2013 Regular Session of the 63rd Legislative Assembly); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
63, § 1-745.5 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 23 (End) of the First Extraordinary Session of 
the 54th Legislature (2013)); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.044 (West, Westlaw 
through end of the 2013 Third Called Session of the 83rd Legislature); see also Isaacson, 716 
F.3d at 1225 (“[V]iability usually occurs between twenty-three and twenty-four weeks gesta-
tion.”).   
 7. ALA. CODE § 26-23B-2 (West, Westlaw through Act 2014-191 of the 2014 Regu-
lar Session); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1403 (West, Westlaw through end of 2013 Regular and 
First Ex. Sessions, including changes made by Ark. Code Rev. Comm. received through 
1/1/2014, and emerg. eff. acts from 2014 Fiscal Sess.: 210); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-503 (West, 
Westlaw through emergency effective legislation of the 2014 Second Regular Session of the 
62nd Idaho Legislature enacted as of March 26, 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6722 (West, 
Westlaw through 2013 regular and special session); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.30.1 
(West, Westlaw through the 2013 Regular Session); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-3,104(West, 
Westlaw through End of 2013 Regular Session); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-745.3 (West 
Westlaw through Chapter 23 (End) of the First Extraordinary Session of the 54th Legisla-
ture (2013)).  
 8. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (explain-
ing that viability is the critical point in time at which the state’s interest in fetal life becomes 
compelling because “the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside 
the mother’s womb.”), holding modified by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1992).  
 9. Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1225.  
 10. Id.; see also David F. Forte, Life, Heartbeat, Birth: A Medical Basis for Reform, 
74 Ohio St. L.J. 121, 138 (2013) (explaining that there is no “consensus among physicians as 
to when viability actually occurs” as some place threshold viability at twenty-two weeks ges-
tational age while others place it at twenty-six weeks gestational age).  
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age.11 Because the twenty-week bans enacted by the states prohibit 
abortions beginning at a point in time prior to viability,12 it is likely the 
United States Supreme Court would hold the laws unconstitutional un-
der current precedent. To date, two courts have reached that same con-
clusion.13 In 2013, both Idaho and Arizona’s twenty-week bans were 
struck down as unconstitutional.14 
Although it appears the twenty-week bans cannot stand under cur-
rent Supreme Court precedent, the medical evidence presented in sup-
port of these new laws and the purpose behind their enactment may 
warrant the Supreme Court revisiting its prior holding in Roe marking 
viability as the critical point. The Court’s holdings in major cases since 
Roe suggest that at some point in the future the Court will indeed revis-
it Roe’s central rule. In Roe, the Court announced a woman’s constitu-
tional right to obtain an abortion prior to viability and the woman’s ab-
solute right to obtain a first-trimester abortion without state interfer-
ence.15 However, since that time, the Supreme Court has slowly been 
chipping away at a woman’s constitutional right to obtain an abortion. 
In Casey, the Court “obliterated [a woman’s] absolute right to [obtain] a 
first-trimester abortion” by announcing the undue burden standard.16 
The undue burden standard allows the State to regulate previability 
abortions so long as they do not unduly burden a woman’s right to 
choose abortion.17 The Court continued to whittle away at Roe in 2007, 
when in Carhart it upheld Congress’s Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 
2003 as a permissible burden on a woman’s right to obtain a previability 
abortion.18 In the Court’s opinion, the majority shifted its focus from a 
woman’s right to choose and instead emphasized the importance of the 
State’s interest in protecting the unborn child and maintaining respect 
for the dignity of human life.19 
Given the developments in the Court’s abortion law precedent, the 
question remains: should the Court revisit Roe’s central rule and change 
the point in time at which the State’s interest in fetal life becomes com-
pelling from fetal viability to fetal pain as suggested by the states’ twen-
ty-week bans? Because the Court, over the last four decades, has ex-
                                                     
 11. See Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1225.  
 12. See id. (“[N]o fetus is viable at twenty weeks gestational age . . . . [V]iability 
usually occurs between twenty-three and twenty-four weeks gestation. Accordingly, Arizo-
na’s ban on abortion from twenty weeks necessarily prohibits previability abortions.”).   
 13. See id.; see also McCormack v. Hiedeman, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1151 (D. Idaho 
2013) (invalidating Idaho’s twenty-week ban).  
 14. Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1226 (invalidating Arizona’s twenty-week ban); McCor-
mack, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1151 (invalidating Idaho’s twenty-week ban).  
 15. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973), holding modified by Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  
 16. Tracy Bach, High Noon in the Abortion Battle? Roe “Reality” Post Gonzales v. 
Carhart, 32 VT. L. REV. 663, 664 (2008); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 837 (1992).  
 17. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874.  
 18. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 133 (2007).  
 19. Id. at 157.  
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panded the State’s interest in potential life both in scope and time by 
allowing the State to place regulations on abortions from the outset of 
pregnancy to protect fetal life and to maintain dignity and respect for 
human life,20 medical evidence indicating that unborn children are ca-
pable of feeling pain beginning at twenty weeks gestational age may 
have a significant impact on abortion law.21 
Part II of this article will begin with an examination of abortion 
law over the last forty years by looking at three major Supreme Court 
cases. Next, part III will discuss, in depth, the impact of existing abor-
tion law precedent on the states’ twenty-week bans. Finally, part IV of 
this article will discuss the Court revisiting its central holding in Roe, 
marking viability as the critical point in time where a State’s interest in 
potential life becomes compelling, and replacing it with fetal pain. 
PART II: ABORTION LAW PRECEDENT THROUGHOUT THE PAST 
FORTY YEARS: ROE V. WADE, PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. 
CASEY, & GONZALES V. CARHART 
In the landmark case of Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court an-
nounced a woman’s absolute right to obtain an abortion during the first 
trimester of pregnancy as well as the right of the State to ban nonthera-
peutic abortions22 post viability.23 However, in the years since that 
groundbreaking opinion, the Court has greatly expanded the State’s in-
terest in protecting fetal life both in time and scope.24 In 1992, the Court 
in Casey rejected Roe’s trimester framework and with it a woman’s ab-
solute right to obtain a first-trimester abortion.25 In place of the tri-
                                                     
 20. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 837 (expanding the State’s interest in fetal life in time by 
adopting the undue burden standard allowing for state regulation of abortion procedures 
from the outset of pregnancy); see also Carhart, 550 U.S. at 157 (expanding the State’s inter-
est in fetal life in scope by upholding the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 as a permis-
sible regulation on previability abortions because it showed “respect for the dignity of human 
life”).  
 21. See supra note 7 (listing the various state statutes that include legislative find-
ings regarding the capacity of a fetus to feel pain at twenty weeks gestational age). 
 22. See generally Therapeutic Abortion, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, available at 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/medical/therapeutic%20abortion (last visited June 29, 
2014) (defining therapeutic abortion as an “abortion induced when pregnancy constitutes a 
threat to the physical or mental health of the mother.”).  
 23. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973), holding modified by Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, (1992) (setting out the trimester framework).  
 24. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 837 (expanding the State’s interest in fetal life in time by 
adopting the undue burden standard allowing for state regulation of abortion procedures 
from the outset of pregnancy); see also Carhart, 550 U.S. at 157 (expanding the State’s inter-
est in fetal life in scope by upholding the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 as a permis-
sible regulation on previability abortions because it showed “respect for the dignity of human 
life.”). 
 25. Casey, 505 U.S. at 837.  
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mester framework the Court adopted the undue burden standard allow-
ing the State to regulate previability abortions in order to further its 
interest not only in maternal health, but also in the life of the fetus, ex-
panding the State’s interest in protecting fetal life in time.26 Although 
the Court in Casey explicitly upheld Roe’s central rule, that a woman 
has a constitutional right to obtain an abortion prior to fetal viability,27 
the ruling “left no doubt that the Court had struck a new balance be-
tween the state’s interest in protecting life and a woman’s right to 
choose.”28 
The Court continued to cut back on Roe and expand the State’s in-
terest in potential life in its 2007 holding in Carhart.29 There, the Court 
upheld Congress’s Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 as a permissi-
ble regulation on previability abortions under the undue burden stand-
ard.30 The majority in Carhart stressed the importance of the State’s 
interest in the life of the fetus and expanded that interest to include re-
spect and dignity for human life.31 The following portion of this article 
will look in depth at these three major Supreme Court rulings that have 
shaped abortion law over the last forty years. 
A. Roe v. Wade 
In 1973 the Supreme Court addressed for the first time the issue of 
a woman’s right to obtain an abortion.32 In Roe, the Court held that a 
woman has a constitutional right, encompassed within the right to pri-
vacy and the right to liberty under the substantive component of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to choose to termi-
nate her pregnancy before fetal viability.33 Although the Court recog-
                                                     
 26. Id.  
 27. Id.  
 28. Bach, supra note 16, at 663. 
 29. See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 156–57 (upholding Congress’s Partial-Birth Abortion 
Ban Act of 2003 under the undue burden standard after finding “[t]he Act expresse[d] re-
spect for the dignity of human life.”). This decision expanded the State’s interest in fetal life 
in scope since the State’s interest in fetal life now encompasses not only protection of fetal 
life, but also maintaining dignity and respect for human life. Id.  
 30. Id. at 156 (“The Act does not on its face impose a substantial obstacle, and we 
reject this further facial challenge to its validity.”).    
 31. Id. at 157–158 (holding that the State’s interest in potential life from the outset 
of pregnancy cannot be treated as unimportant, and thus finding that the State can use its 
regulatory power to express respect for the dignity of human life).  
 32. The Supreme Court and Abortion Access, NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES 
1 (Aug. 2008), http://www.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/repro/abortion/the-
supreme-court-and-abortion.pdf (discussing that prior to 1850 abortion was legal in the 
United States, but beginning in 1850 states began enacting strict bans on abortions leading 
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe holding “that access to abortion is a fundamental 
constitutional right that government may not restrict without a very strong reason–a state 
interest that must be ‘compelling’”).  
 33. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (“[T]he right of personal privacy includes 
the abortion decision.”), holding modified by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992). The Roe court also held that “[a] state criminal abortion statute . . . that 
excepts from criminality only a life-saving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard 
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nized a woman’s fundamental right to obtain an abortion, it made clear 
that such a right was not absolute.34 In determining when the State 
could interfere with a woman’s fundamental right to choose abortion, 
the Court used strict scrutiny review and set out the trimester frame-
work.35 
Under the trimester framework, the Court determined that during 
the first trimester of pregnancy, the time prior to twelve weeks gesta-
tional age, “the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the 
medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician.”36 
Thus, during that time, the State could not place regulations on abor-
tion procedures for any reason.37 However, the Court held that during 
the second trimester of pregnancy the State’s interest in the health of 
the pregnant woman became compelling; therefore, State regulations of 
abortion procedures to maintain maternal health during that time were 
permitted.38 Further, the Court found that at twenty-eight weeks gesta-
tional age a fetus was viable.39 At that time, the Court deemed the 
State’s interest in potential life sufficiently compelling to warrant pro-
hibitions on abortion except where necessary to preserve the life or 
health of the mother.40 Thus, under Roe and the trimester framework: a 
woman had the absolute right to obtain a first-trimester abortion with-
out State interference, viability was deemed the critical point in time at 
which the State could prohibit abortions to further its interest in poten-
tial life, and, between those two points in time, the State could regulate 
abortion procedures only to further its interest in maternal health.41 
In parsing out the State’s dual interests in maternal health and fe-
tal life under the trimester framework, the Court declared that the 
State has “an important and legitimate interest in preserving and pro-
tecting the health of the pregnant woman [and] . . . another important 
and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life.”42 
The Court went on to explain that: 
These interests are separate and distinct. Each grows in sub-
stantiality as the woman approaches term and, at a point during 
pregnancy, each becomes compelling. With respect to the State’s 
                                                                                                                           
to pregnancy stage and without recognition of the other interests involved, is violative of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). Id. at 164. 
 34. Id. at 154.  
 35. See id. at 155, 164–66.  
 36. Id. at 164.  
 37. See id. 
 38. Id. at 163–64. 
 39. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160.  
 40. Id. at 164–65.  
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. at 162.  
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important and legitimate interest in the health of the mother, 
the ‘compelling’ point, in light of present medical knowledge, is 
at approximately the end of the first trimester. . . . With respect 
to the State’s important and legitimate interest in potential life, 
the ‘compelling’ point is at viability. This is so because the fetus 
then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside 
the mother’s womb. State regulation protective of fetal life after 
viability thus has both logical and biological justifications. If the 
State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may 
go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period except when 
it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.43 
In establishing this trimester framework, the Court undertook the 
challenge of balancing the State’s interests in maternal health and fetal 
life against the pregnant woman’s constitutional right to choose abor-
tion.44 To achieve this task, the Court, and specifically Justice 
Blackmun, the author of the Roe opinion, relied heavily on medical evi-
dence and approached the issue of abortion as a medical problem and 
not as a legal or moral issue.45 Under this approach, Justice Blackmun 
focused on the medical consequences of an abortion at each stage of 
pregnancy.46 
During the first trimester of pregnancy, Justice Blackmun found 
that the “[m]ortality rate[] for women undergoing early abortions . . . 
appear[ed] to be as low as or lower” than that associated with natural 
childbirth.47 Based on this medical evidence, Justice Blackmun declared 
the right of a woman’s physician to determine, based on his or her medi-
cal judgment, if the woman’s pregnancy should be terminated and to do 
so without interference from the State.48 Although Justice Blackmun 
focused on the right of the woman’s physician to determine abortion for 
her rather than the woman’s right to choose abortion for herself, this is 
not surprising as the statute at issue in Roe criminalized physicians for 
performing abortions and not women for obtaining them.49 Thus, Roe 
gave the woman the absolute right to choose to obtain a first-trimester 
abortion and allowed her physician, based on his medical judgment, to 
perform such an abortion without criminal penalties because of the low 
mortality rate for abortions during this time period.50 
                                                     
 43. Id. at 162–64.   
 44. See id. at 162–65 (explaining the State’s dual interests in maternal health and 
potential life and setting out the trimester framework so as to allow the State to assert its 
interests while not trampling over the woman’s constitutional right to obtain an abortion).  
 45. See id. at 149, 160–61, 163; Forte, supra note 10, at 123. 
 46. See infra notes 47, 51, 54 and accompanying text.  
 47. Roe, 410 U.S. at 149. Thus, the “State’s . . .  concern in enacting a criminal abor-
tion law . . . to protect the pregnant woman, that is, to restrain her from submitting to a pro-
cedure that placed her life in serious jeopardy” is not a valid concern during the first tri-
mester of pregnancy. Id.   
 48. Id. at 164.  
 49. Bach, supra note 16, at 665.  
 50. Roe, 410 U.S. at 149, 164.  
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During the second trimester of pregnancy, medical evidence showed 
that the risks associated with abortion increased; therefore, abortions 
during the second trimester posed a greater danger to the life and 
health of the pregnant woman.51 Because of these increased risks and 
the possible consequences of an abortion, Justice Blackmun asserted 
that the State’s interest in maternal health and life became compel-
ling.52 Thus, during the second trimester, the State could regulate abor-
tion procedures to maintain maternal health.53 
At twenty-eight weeks of pregnancy, or the beginning of the third 
trimester, Justice Blackmun found that the consequences of an abortion 
began to impact the unborn child in a more definite way because at that 
point in time a fetus was deemed viable and had the potential to survive 
outside the womb.54 In making this determination, Justice Blackmun 
relied on medical evidence. He pointed out that physicians and those in 
the scientific arena determined that life began either “upon conception, 
upon live birth, or upon the interim point at which the fetus becomes 
‘viable,’ that is, potentially able to live outside the mother’s womb . . . 
with artificial aid.”55 Based on “embryological data that . . . indicate[d] 
that conception [was] a ‘process’ over time, rather than an event, and . . . 
medical techniques such as menstrual extraction, the ‘morning-after’ 
pill, implantation of embryos, artificial insemination, and . . . artificial 
wombs,”56 Justice Blackmun rejected the notion that life began upon 
conception. He ultimately settled on fetal viability, which occurred at 
roughly twenty-eight weeks of pregnancy in 1973,57 as the point in time 
at which the State’s interest in protecting potential life became suffi-
ciently compelling so as to justify prohibitions on abortions.58 This was 
the case because Justice Blackmun felt that, at that point in time, “the 
fetus . . . ha[d] the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s 
womb.”59 Moreover, he found “State regulation protective of fetal life 
after viability . . . ha[d] both logical and biological justifications.”60 Thus, 
                                                     
 51. Id. at 150 (“[T]he risk [associated with abortion] to the woman increases as her 
pregnancy continues. Thus, the State retains a definite interest in protecting the woman’s 
own health and safety when an abortion is proposed at a late stage of pregnancy.”).   
 52. See id. at 163–64 (holding that the State could infringe on the woman’s funda-
mental right to obtain an abortion by regulating abortion procedures “in ways . . . reasonably 
related to maternal health.”).   
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. at 160, 163 (discussing that viability occurred at roughly the twenty-eighth 
week of pregnancy, and at the point of viability medical evidence indicated that an unborn 
child “ha[d] the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.”).   
 55. Id. at 160.  
 56. Roe, 410 U.S. at 161. 
 57. Id. at 160.  
 58. Id. at 164–65.  
 59. Id. at 163.  
 60. Id.  
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because an abortion after viability terminated a fetus potentially capa-
ble of survival outside the womb, the Court set viability as the critical 
point in time at which the State’s interest in fetal life was compelling 
enough to warrant prohibitions on abortion. 
As evident from the above discussion of Roe, medical evidence 
played an important role in Justice Blackmun’s formation of the tri-
mester framework and in the Court’s determination that viability 
should be the critical point in time when the State’s interest in potential 
life becomes compelling. Medical evidence has continued to play a role in 
the Court’s abortion law jurisprudence over the past several decades. As 
indicated in the following discussion of Casey and Carhart, develop-
ments in medical evidence have allowed the Court to expand the State’s 
“important and legitimate interest in [protecting] potential [human] life” 
in both time and scope.61 
B. Planned Parenthood v. Casey 
Although Roe’s central rule is still at the heart of abortion law to-
day, in 1992 the Court, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, dramatically 
altered the test for analyzing restrictions on a woman’s fundamental 
right to obtain an abortion by adopting the undue burden standard.62 
With the adoption of the undue burden standard, the Court, in a frac-
tured opinion,63 expanded the State’s interest in potential life in time by 
allowing for state regulation of abortion procedures from the outset of 
pregnancy.64 Although the Court adopted a new test for analyzing re-
strictions on abortions, the Court applied the doctrine of stare decisis 
and declined to completely overturn Roe.65 In declining to overturn the 
landmark case, the Court reaffirmed Roe’s three central principles.66 
The first principle the Court reaffirmed was “the right of [a] woman 
to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without 
undue interference from the State.”67 The Court explained that “[b]efore 
viability, the State’s interests are not strong enough to support a prohi-
bition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the wom-
an’s effective right to elect [to have an abortion].”68 The second principle 
the Court confirmed from Roe was the State’s power to proscribe abor-
tions after fetal viability.69 With regard to the second principle, the 
                                                     
  61.  Id. at 162. 
 62. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837 (1992).  
 63. Id. at 833–43 (three Justices delivered the opinion of the Court with others con-
curring and dissenting throughout different portions of the opinion). 
 64. See id. at 876 (rejecting the trimester framework and adopting the undue bur-
den standard to allow the State to promote its interest in potential life throughout pregnan-
cy).  
 65. Id. at 845–46. 
 66. Id. at 846.  
 67. Id.   
 68. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.  
 69. Id. 
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Court again emphasized that “[v]iability marks the earliest point at 
which the State’s interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to jus-
tify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions.”70 The third principle 
reaffirmed by the Court was a recognition of “the State[’s] legitimate 
interests from the outset of pregnancy in protecting the health of the 
woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child.”71 Although the 
Court declined to overrule Roe and reaffirmed Roe’s central principles, 
the Court stated that Roe’s central holding erred when it came to the 
strength of the State’s interest in fetal protection.72 
In addressing the State’s interest in protecting the life of the fetus, 
the Court expressed the opinion that the trimester framework set out in 
Roe did not allow the State to assert its interest in protecting fetal life 
because the State was not allowed to regulate abortions during the first 
trimester and could only regulate abortions during the second trimester 
to promote its interest in protecting maternal health.73 On this point, 
the Court stated the following in its opinion: 
Roe v. Wade was express in its recognition of the State's “im-
portant and legitimate interest[s] in preserving and protecting 
the health of the pregnant woman [and] in protecting the poten-
tiality of human life.” The trimester framework, however, does 
not fulfill Roe's own promise that the State has an interest in 
protecting fetal life or potential life. Roe began the contradiction 
by using the trimester framework to forbid any regulation of 
abortion designed to advance that interest before viability. Be-
fore viability, Roe and subsequent cases treat all governmental 
attempts to influence a woman's decision on behalf of the poten-
tial life within her as unwarranted. This treatment is, in our 
judgment, incompatible with the recognition that there is a sub-
stantial state interest in potential life throughout pregnancy.74 
Expanding on the State’s “substantial interest” in the unborn fetus 
the Court continued on to say, “The very notion that the State has a 
substantial interest in potential life leads to the conclusion that not all 
regulations must be deemed unwarranted. Not all burdens on the right 
                                                     
 70. Id. at 835–36.  
 71. Id. at 846.  
 72. Id. at 858 (stating that the “central holding of Roe was in error [in undervalu-
ing] the strength of the state interest in fetal protection, not to the recognition afforded by 
the Constitution to the woman’s liberty.”); see also id. at 837 (“To protect the central right 
recognized by Roe while at the same time accommodating the State’s profound interest in 
potential life, the undue burden standard should be employed” in place of the trimester 
framework).  
 73. Casey, 505 U.S. at 872.  
 74. Id. at 875–76 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  
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to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy will be undue.”75 This view 
laid the foundation for the adoption of the undue burden standard in 
place of the trimester framework.76 
In rejecting the trimester framework, the Court pointed to both 
flaws in the framework itself and advances in medical technology. In 
regards to the flaws in the framework, the Court held: “The trimester 
framework suffers from these basic flaws: in its formulation it miscon-
ceives the nature of the pregnant woman's interest; and in practice it 
undervalues the State's interest in potential life, as recognized in Roe.”77 
Moreover, the Court found that advances in medical technology in the 
ensuing years since Roe had rendered the trimester framework “prob-
lematic.”78 The Court appeared to pick up on the position held by Justice 
O’Connor in her dissenting opinion in the 1983 case of City of Akron v. 
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, where she explained: 
[a]s the medical risks of various abortion procedures decrease, 
the point at which the State may regulate for reasons of mater-
nal health is moved further forward to actual childbirth. As 
medical science becomes better able to provide for the separate 
existence of the fetus, the point of viability is moved further 
back toward conception.79 
Thus, because of the inherent flaws in the trimester framework and 
because of medical advances rendering the framework increasingly un-
workable, the Court opted to reject the trimester framework.80 
With the rejection of the trimester framework, the Court stated: 
“To protect the central right recognized by Roe v. Wade while at the 
same time accommodating the State’s profound interest in potential 
life,” the undue burden standard should be employed.81 The undue bur-
den standard announced by the Court proclaimed that the State could 
regulate previability abortion procedures so long as the regulations did 
not have the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the 
path of women seeking to abort a nonviable fetus.82 Therefore, under 
Casey’s undue burden standard, the State may regulate previability 
                                                     
 75. Id. at 876.  
 76. See id. at 875–76.  
 77. Id. at 873.  
 78. Id. at 873 (citing to Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Webster v. Reprod. 
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 529 (1989) in which she described the trimester framework as 
“problematic”); see also City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 
458 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the trimester framework was on a “colli-
sion course with itself”), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992). 
 79. City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 458; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 873 (citing to Justice 
O’Connor’s  concurring opinion in Webster, 492 U.S. at 529, in which Justice O’Connor stated 
that “I dissented from the Court's opinion in Akron because it was my view [and continues to 
be my view] that, Roe's trimester framework [is] . . . problematic.”). 
 80. Casey, 505 U.S. at 873.  
 81. Id. at 878.  
 82. Id.at 877.  
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abortions so long as such regulations do not unduly burden a woman’s 
right to choose abortion, and the State can continue to prohibit post via-
bility abortions.83 Thus, the adoption of the undue burden standard ex-
panded the State’s interest in potential life in time by allowing for State 
regulation of abortion procedures from the outset of pregnancy to pro-
mote the State’s interest in potential life.84 
However, despite the rejection of the trimester framework, under 
the undue burden standard the Court continued to uphold Roe’s central 
rule marking viability as the critical point in time where the State’s in-
terest in potential life becomes compelling.85 Although medical develop-
ments had moved the point of viability from roughly twenty-eight weeks 
of pregnancy to twenty-four weeks of pregnancy,86 the Court stated that 
the imprecision on the precise point of viability, which would continue to 
be affected by medical advances, was within tolerable limits.87 Further, 
the Court stated that fetal viability was a fair point in time to begin al-
lowing the State to ban abortions because “a woman who fails to act be-
fore viability has consented to the State’s intervention on behalf of the 
developing child.”88 
Although the Court’s opinion in Casey expressly reaffirmed Roe’s 
central rule, the “shift from Roe’s trimester [framework] to [the] undue 
burden [standard] left no doubt that the Court had struck a new balance 
between the State’s interest in protecting life and a woman’s right to 
choose.”89 The Court’s adoption of the undue burden standard greatly 
expanded the State’s interest in potential life in time by allowing for 
regulation of abortion procedures from the outset of pregnancy in order 
to promote the State’s interest in potential life.90 Thus, the undue bur-
den standard gave the State more power to regulate abortions while at 
the same time taking away the woman’s absolute right to obtain a first-
trimester abortion.91 After Casey, abortion law was dramatically 
changed and as Chief Justice Rehnquist stated in his dissent in Casey, 
                                                     
 83. Id. at 878.  
 84. See id. at 876–77. Adoption of the undue burden standard expanded the State’s 
interest in potential life in time because under the trimester framework the State was not 
allowed to regulate abortion procedures during the first trimester of pregnancy, and could 
only do so during the second trimester of pregnancy to promote its interest in maternal 
health; however, under the undue burden stranded, the State can now regulate abortion 
procedures from the outset of pregnancy to promote its interest in potential life. Id. 
 85. Id. at 879.  
  86.   Casey, 505 U.S. at 860.  
 87. Id. at 870.  
 88. Id.  
 89. Bach, supra note 16, at 663.  
 90. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.  
 91. Bach, supra note 16, at 664.  
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“Roe continues to exist [today], but only in the way a storefront on a 
western movie set exists: a mere facade to give the illusion of reality.”92 
Between 1992 and 2000 the Court applied the undue burden 
standard to six different types of abortion regulations and found only 
two unconstitutional.93 In 2007, the Court again took up the issue of a 
previability abortion regulation in Gonzales v. Carhart.94 This time, the 
regulation at issue was one promulgated by the federal government.95        
C. Gonzales v. Carhart 
In the most recent Supreme Court decision regarding abortion, the 
Court addressed the issue of whether Congress’s Partial-Birth Abortion 
Ban Act of 2003 was a permissible regulation on previability abortions.96 
The statute at issue in Carhart prohibited all intact dilation and extrac-
tion (“D&E”) procedures.97 The intact D&E procedure was a method 
used by some physicians to terminate pregnancy in late term abor-
tions.98 The Court ultimately upheld the Act as a constitutional regula-
tion on previability abortions after evaluating it under the undue bur-
den standard.99 In its opinion, the Court reviewed medical evidence pre-
sented to Congress regarding the procedure, evaluated the congressional 
findings, and looked to Congress’s purpose for banning the procedure. 
The medical evidence reviewed by the Court included two detailed de-
scriptions of the intact D&E procedure, the first given by a doctor and 
the second by a nurse.100 The testimonies appear to have played a key 
role in not only Congress’s decision to ban the procedure, but also in the 
Court’s decision to uphold the Act.101 The doctor gave the following tes-
timony describing the procedure before Congress:  
 
The fetus is delivered intact until the head lodges in the cervix 
of the woman. At that point the doctor performing the abortion 
inserts scissors into the cervix and places them by the skull of 
the fetus. The doctor then “forces the scissors into the base of the 
                                                     
 92. Casey, 505 U.S. at 954 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  
 93. Bach, supra note 16, at 663–64.  
 94. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, (2007).  
 95. Id. at 132.  
 96. Id. at 132 (“These cases require us to consider the validity of the Partial-Birth 
Abortion Ban Act of 2003, a federal statute regulating abortion procedures.”); see also id. at 
156 (“The question is whether the Act, measured by its text in this facial attack, imposes a 
substantial obstacle to late-term, but previability, abortions.”).  
 97. Id. at 136.   
 98. Id. at 135.  
 99. Id. at 156 (“The Act does not on its face impose a substantial obstacle, and we 
reject this further facial challenge to its validity.”).  
100. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 138–39.  
101. See id. at 157. In finding Congress had a rational reason for the enactment of 
the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, the Court stated, after reviewing the medical 
testimony and evidence, that:  “The Act expresses respect for the dignity of human life.” Id.   
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skull or into the foramen magnum. Having safely entered the 
skull, [the doctor] spreads the scissors to enlarge the opening.”102 
 
The nurse’s testimony, in contrast to the doctor’s testimony, referred to 
the fetus as a baby and gave a much more graphic depiction of the pro-
cedure.103 The nurse described the procedure as follows: 
[The doctor] went in with forceps and grabbed the baby’s legs 
and pulled them down into the birth canal. Then he delivered 
the baby’s body and the arms—everything but the head. The 
doctor kept the head right inside the uterus . . . . The baby’s lit-
tle fingers were clasping and unclasping, and his little feet were 
kicking. Then the doctor stuck the scissors in the back of his 
head, and the baby’s arms jerked out, like a startle reaction, like 
a flinch, like a baby does when he thinks he is going to fall. The 
doctor opened up the scissors, stuck a high-powered suction tube 
into the opening, and sucked the baby’s brains out. Now the ba-
by went completely limp . . . . He cut the umbilical cord and de-
livered the placenta. He threw the baby in a pan, along with the 
placenta and the instruments he had just used.104 
Next, the Court turned to Congress’s findings regarding the proce-
dure and the purpose behind the enactment of the Partial-Birth Abor-
tion Ban. The Court cited to Congress’s concerns about the overall nega-
tive impact of the procedure on society105 as well as the negative effects 
performing the intact D&E procedure had on the medical community 
and its reputation.106 Concerning the negative impact on society, Con-
gress found that “implicitly approving such a brutal and inhumane pro-
cedure by choosing not to prohibit it w[ould] further coarsen society to 
the humanity of not only newborns, but all vulnerable and innocent 
human life, making it increasingly difficult to protect such life.”107 Fur-
ther, in regards to the negative impact on the medical community, Con-
gress cited “a moral, medical, and ethical consensus . . . that the practice 
of performing a partial-birth abortion . . . [was] a gruesome and inhu-
mane procedure that [was] never medically necessary and should be 
prohibited.”108 Moreover, Congress found that “[p]artial-birth abortion . . 
. confuse[d] the medical, legal, and ethical duties of physicians to pre-
                                                     
102. Id. at 138.  
103. Id. at 138–39.  
104. Id. (quoting with omissions the nurse’s testimony before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee).  
105. Id. at 157.  
106. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 157. 
107. Id.  
108. Id. at 141. 
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serve and promote life, [because] the physician act[ed] directly against 
the physical life of a child whom he or she had just delivered, all but the 
head, out of the womb, in order to end that life.”109 Thus, Congress’s 
purpose for enacting the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act was to protect 
humanity and the medical profession from the horrors of such a proce-
dure.110 
After reviewing the medical testimony regarding the procedure, the 
legislative findings, and the purpose behind the enactment of the statue, 
the Court evaluated the Act under the undue burden standard and yet 
again expanded the State’s interest in potential life, this time in 
scope.111 To begin its analysis, the Court emphasized the State’s interest 
in protecting the life of the fetus that may become a child from the out-
set of pregnancy.112 The Court pointed out that “Casey rejected both 
Roe’s rigid trimester framework and the interpretation of Roe that con-
sidered all previability regulations of abortion unwarranted.”113 Moreo-
ver, the Court stated that Casey overruled two prior holdings because 
they “undervalued the State’s interest in potential life.”114 Thus, based 
on the expansion of the State’s interest in potential life in Casey, the 
Court stated, “regulations which do no more than create a structural 
mechanism by which the State . . . may express profound respect for the 
life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to 
the woman’s exercise of the right to choose.”115 
Based on this expanded undue burden standard, the Court found 
that the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act was a permissible regulation of 
previability abortions.116 The Court stated that the State’s interest in 
protecting the unborn child couldn’t be treated as unimportant and fur-
ther held that the State could “use its voice and its regulatory authority 
to show its profound respect for the life within the woman.”117 On this 
point, the Court held that the Act at issue merely “expresse[d] respect 
for the dignity of human life” because the ban procedure allowed a fetus 
to be killed just inches before completion of the birth process.118 In addi-
tion, the Court found that the State had “an interest in protecting the 
integrity and ethics of the medical profession.”119 Thus, the Court ex-
                                                     
109. Id. at 157.  
110. See id. at 156–57.  
111. See id. at 156 (holding the Act constitutional under the undue burden stand-
ard); see also id. at 157 (stating the Act merely prohibited a form of abortion that killed a 
fetus “just inches before completion of the birth process” and thus finding: “The Act ex-
press[ed] respect for human life.”). Thus, the Court expanded the State’s interest in potential 
life in scope by allowing for regulations on abortion procedures to promote not only fetal life 
but respect for human life.  
112. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 158.  
113. Id. at 146.  
114. Id. at 157.  
115. Id. at 146.  
116. Id. at 156.  
117. Id. at 157–58.  
118. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 156–57.  
119. Id. at 157.  
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panded the State’s interest in potential life in scope to encompass digni-
ty and respect for human life and held the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban 
Act did not impose an undue burden on a woman’s right to choose a 
previability abortion despite the fact the Act had the incidental effect of 
making it more difficult to obtain such an abortion.120 
As illustrated by Casey and Carhart, since Roe the Court has slow-
ly been chipping away at a woman’s right to obtain a previability abor-
tion without interference from the State while at the same time expand-
ing the State’s interest in potential life in time and scope. Although 
Roe’s central rule, holding women have a constitutional right to obtain a 
previability abortion, is still intact, the Court in Casey and again in 
Carhart showed a willingness to uphold laws protecting the life of the 
unborn fetus. The question remains: How far does the State’s ability to 
protect the fetus go and are laws banning abortions beginning at twenty 
weeks gestational age beyond the scope of this protection? 
PART III: THE IMPACT OF CURRENT SUPREME COURT 
ABORTION LAW PRECEDENT ON THE STATES TWENTY-WEEK 
BANS 
As discussed in Part II of this article, under current Supreme Court 
precedent the State can prohibit post-viability abortions and regulate 
previability abortions so long as such regulations do not unduly burden 
a woman’s right to make the ultimate choice to have an abortion.121 As 
abortion law stands in its present state, the statutes being enacted by 
states banning abortions beginning at twenty weeks post-fertilization 
are unconstitutional.122 To date, two courts have come to the same con-
clusion.123 In McCormack v. Hiedeman, the United States District Court 
for the District of Idaho held Idaho’s Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protec-
tion Act, which bans all abortions beginning at twenty weeks gestational 
age, unconstitutional under Casey’s undue burden standard.124 Two 
months later, in May 2013, the Ninth Circuit Court held an almost iden-
tical Arizona law per se unconstitutional in Isaacson v. Horne.125 The 
court stated in its decision that the law at issue was a complete ban on 
some previability abortions.126 Thus, the court held the law unconstitu-
                                                     
120. See id. at 156–58.  
121. See supra Part II.B (discussing Casey’s undue burden standard).  
122. See infra Parts III.A, III.B, III.C, and III.D.  
123. McCormack v. Hiedeman, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1128, (D. Idaho 2013) (invalidating 
Idaho’s twenty-week ban); Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213, (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 
134 S. Ct. 905 (2014) (invalidating Arizona’s twenty-week ban).  
124. McCormack, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1149–51.  
125. Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1217.  
126. Id.  
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tional on its face without even employing the undue burden standard.127 
The following section of this article, Part III, will look at the two above-
mentioned cases and will evaluate their holdings under current prece-
dent. 
A. McCormack v. Hiedeman 
In McCormack v. Hiedeman, decided in March 2013 by the United 
States District Court for the District of Idaho, the district court took up 
the constitutionality of Idaho’s Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection 
Act.128 Like many similar laws enacted by various states,129 the Idaho 
law mimics proposed federal legislation130 and asserts a new compelling 
state interest in preventing fetal pain.131 The Idaho legislation reads as 
follows: 
No person shall perform or induce or attempt to perform or in-
duce an abortion upon a woman when it has been determined, 
by the physician performing or inducing the abortion or by an-
other physician upon whose determination that physician relies, 
that the probable postfertilization age of the woman’s unborn 
child is twenty (20) or more weeks unless, in reasonable medical 
judgment: (1) she has a condition that so complicates her medi-
cal condition as to necessitate the abortion of her pregnancy to 
avert her death or to avert serious risk of substantial and irre-
versible physical impairment of a major bodily function, not in-
cluding psychological or emotional conditions; or (2) it is neces-
sary to preserve the life of an unborn child. No such condition 
shall be deemed to exist if it is based on a claim or diagnosis 
that the woman will engage in conduct that she intends to result 
in her death or in substantial and irreversible physical impair-
ment of a major bodily function.132 
Idaho’s Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act, like legislation 
enacted in other states, is based on the State’s assessment of medical 
evidence indicating that an unborn child can feel pain as early as twenty 
weeks gestational age.133 Federal congressional findings regarding the 
                                                     
127. Id. at 1225.  
128. McCormack, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1149–51.  
129. See supra note 4.   
130. See Forte, supra note 10, at 134 (“Ten states have passed a version of the Pain-
Capable Unborn Child Protection Act. The Act prohibits abortion after twenty weeks of 
pregnancy based on the State’s assessment of medical evidence that the unborn child could 
experience pain as early as twenty weeks. Nebraska was the first state to pass a version of 
the Act in 2010, which borrows its language from proposed federal bills.”).  
131. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-503 (West 2013).  
132. Id. at § 18-505.  
133. Id. at § 18-503; see also supra note 7 (listing the various state statutes that in-
clude legislative findings regarding the capacity of a fetus to feel pain at twenty weeks gesta-
tional age); see also Forte, supra note 10, at 134 (“The [Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protec-
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capability of fetuses to experience pain, which have greatly influenced 
the enactment of these various state statutes, assert the following: 
Pain receptors . . . are present throughout the unborn child’s en-
tire body and nerves link these receptors to the brain’s thalamus 
and subcortical plate by no later than 20 weeks after fertiliza-
tion.134 […] After 20 weeks, the unborn child reacts to stimuli 
that would be recognized as painful if applied to an adult hu-
man, for example, by recoiling.135 […] For the purposes of sur-
gery on unborn children, fetal anesthesia is routinely adminis-
tered and is associated with a decrease in stress hormones com-
pared to their level when painful stimuli are applied without 
such anesthesia. In the United States, surgery of this type is be-
ing performed by 20 weeks after fertilization and earlier in spe-
cialized units affiliated with children’s hospitals.136 
 
The position, asserted by some physicians, that the unborn child 
is incapable of experiencing pain until a point later in pregnancy 
than 20 weeks after fertilization predominately rests on the as-
sumption that the ability to experience pain depends on the cer-
ebral cortex and requires nerve connections between the thala-
mus and the cortex. However, recent medical research and anal-
ysis, especially since 2007, provides strong evidence for the con-
clusion that a functioning cortex is not necessary to experience 
pain.137 
 
Substantial evidence indicates that children born missing the 
bulk of the cerebral cortex, those with hydronencephaly, never-
theless experience pain.138 […] In adult humans and in animals, 
stimulation or ablation of the cerebral cortex does not alter pain 
perception, while stimulation or ablation of the thalamus 
does.139   […] The position, asserted by some commentators, that 
the unborn child remains in a coma-like sleep state that pre-
cludes the unborn child experiencing pain is inconsistent with 
the documented reaction of the unborn children to painful stim-
uli and with the experience of fetal surgeons who have found it 
                                                                                                                           
tion] Act prohibits abortion after twenty weeks of pregnancy based on the State’s assessment 
of medical evidence that the unborn child could experience pain as early as twenty weeks.”).  
134. 159 CONG. REC. H3730-01 (daily ed. June 18, 2013). 
135. Id.  
136. Id. at 3731. 
137. Id.  
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
158 IDAHO LAW REVIEW [VOL. 50 
 
necessary to sedate the unborn child with anesthesia to prevent 
the unborn child from engaging in vigorous movement in reac-
tion to invasive surgery.140 […] [T]here is substantial medical ev-
idence that an unborn child is capable of experiencing pain at 
least by 20 weeks after fertilization, if not earlier.141 
 
It is the purpose of the Congress to assert a compelling govern-
mental interest in protecting the lives of unborn children from 
the stage at which substantial medical evidence indicates that 
they are capable of feeling pain.142 […] The compelling govern-
ment interest in protecting the lives of unborn children from the 
stage at which substantial medical evidence indicates that they 
are capable of feeling pain is intended to be separate from and 
independent of the compelling governmental interest in protect-
ing the lives of unborn children from the stage of viability, and 
neither governmental interest is intended to replace the other.143 
 
Although the evidence presented by Idaho, and other states, re-
garding the purpose behind the enactment of the Pain-Capable Unborn 
Child Protection Act is compelling and the argument that the State has 
an interest in protecting unborn children beginning at the time in which 
they are capable of feeling pain a logical one, the Idaho District Court in 
McCormack struck down the Act as unconstitutional.144 In reaching its 
decision to strike down the law as unconstitutional, the district court 
was bound by prior Supreme Court precedent.145 Thus, the district court 
used the undue burden standard set out in Casey in evaluating the con-
stitutionality of Idaho’s twenty-week ban.146 
The district court in McCormack reasoned that, under the undue 
burden standard, Idaho’s twenty-week ban was unconstitutional for two 
major reasons. First, the district court found that the Act did not fall 
into either of the two “permissible” categories of regulations on previa-
bility abortions upheld by the Supreme Court as constitutional.147 Sec-
ond, the district court held that the purpose of the law was to place an 
                                                     
140. 159 CONG. REC. H3730-01 (daily ed. June 18, 2013). 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id.  
144. McCormack v. Hiedeman, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1151 (D. Idaho 2013).  
145. Id. at 1149 (discussing how “[t]he Idaho legislature enacted the PUCPA in the 
face of the Idaho Attorney General’s declaration that it is likely unconstitutional because it 
prohibits some non-therapeutic abortions before a fetus has reached viability,” and then 
continuing on to quote Casey and the undue burden standard).   
146. Id. at 1149–51.  
147. Id. at 1149–50 (asserting that “in Casey, the Supreme Court held that the 
state’s dual interests in fetal life and maternal health permit only two broad categories of 
regulations before fetal viability[:]” those to insure informed consent and those to protect the 
health and safety of the mother. Based on this, the court found that Idaho’s PUCPA did not 
fall into either category).  
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insuperable obstacle in the way of women seeking previability abortions 
and the effect of the law did just that, both of which are prohibited un-
der the undue burden standard.148 Thus, the district court struck down 
the Idaho Act as unconstitutional.149 
Under its first line of reasoning, the court explained that the 
State’s dual interests in fetal life and maternal health permit only two 
broad categories of previability regulations: measures to ensure that a 
women’s choice is informed and regulations to protect the health and 
safety of the mother.150 Because the Supreme Court itself has never 
made such an assertion, a discussion of how the district court appeared 
to reach this conclusion is necessary before examining the district 
court’s analysis of why the twenty-week ban did not fit into either per-
missible category. 
Although unclear from the court’s opinion, it seems the district 
court in McCormack came to the conclusion that only two permissible 
categories of previability regulations exist under the undue burden 
standard by examining prior Supreme Court holdings.151 Post Casey, 
under the undue burden standard, the Supreme Court has upheld five 
types of regulations on previability abortions: 1) regulations requiring 
parental consent, or, alternatively, a judicial decree, before a physician 
performs an abortion on a minor;152 2) regulations requiring abortion 
facilities to file a report on each abortion performed;153 3) regulations 
requiring physicians to provide information on abortions and other op-
tions to a woman prior to performing an abortion;154 4) regulations re-
quiring physicians to wait twenty-four hours after a woman first tries to 
procure an abortion before performing such abortion;155 and 5) the Par-
tial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 at issue in Carhart that banned the 
intact D&E procedure.156 
The first two types of regulations discussed above fall into the dis-
trict court’s “permissible” category of “regulations protecting the health 
and safety of the mother,”157 while the third and fourth type of regula-
                                                     
148. Id. at 1151.  
149. Id.  
150. McCormack, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1149–50.   
151. See id.  
152. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992). 
153. Id. at 900–01.  
154. Id. at 881–87. 
155. Id.  
156. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 133 (2007). 
157. Four Justices in Casey concluded that a regulation requiring parental consent 
ensured the welfare of minor mothers, while a regulation requiring abortion clinics to report 
on abortion procedures furthered the State’s interest in maternal health. See Casey, 505 U.S. 
at 841. However, three other Justices in Casey concluded that the parental consent provision 
was designed to ensure informed consent. See id. at 899–900. 
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tions fall into the court’s second category of “permissible” regulations 
“ensuring that a woman’s choice is informed.”158 However, understand-
ing which of the two “permissible” categories of previability regulations 
the district court placed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act in is more 
difficult. The only way the Act seems to fall into either category is to 
place it in the category of regulations ensuring a woman’s informed 
choice. Placing it in such a category is logical because, the argument 
goes, a woman fully informed of what the intact D&E procedure entailed 
would never elect to have it done.159 Thus, by enacting the Partial-Birth 
Abortion Ban Act, Congress was merely imposing a regulation ensuring 
a woman’s informed consent by requiring the result that any informed 
woman would reach.160 
In the district court’s analysis of Idaho’s twenty-week ban in 
McCormack, the court held that the Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protec-
tion Act did not fall into either of the two “permissible” categories of 
previability regulations.161 The district court found that the Act did not 
protect maternal health or safety because “[w]hen the Idaho legislature 
enacted the PUCPA, no mention was made of the health and safety of 
the mother.”162 Rather, the court found, the primary purpose of the Act 
was to protect the fetus—not the pregnant woman.163 Further, the court 
found that the Act did not ensure a woman’s informed choice because 
the Act was “not designed to make women more informed”; rather, its 
clear purpose was to narrow the universe of previously allowable previ-
ability abortions since it categorically banned non-therapeutic abortions 
at and after twenty weeks.164 Thus, because the Act did not protect ma-
ternal health or safety nor did it ensure an informed choice, the court 
found that it did not fall into either “permissible” category of previability 
abortion regulations.165 
The district court’s second reason for holding Idaho’s twenty-week 
ban unconstitutional centered on the purpose and the effect of the 
                                                     
158. See id. at 887 (discussing how the regulations at issue requiring a physician to 
provide a woman with information on abortion and other options twenty-four hours prior to 
performing an abortion ensured the woman’s informed consent).  
159. Bach, supra note 16, at 668–69; see also Carhart, 550 U.S. at 160 (“It is a rea-
sonable inference that a necessary effect of the regulation and the knowledge it conveys will 
be to encourage some women to carry the infant to full term, thus reducing the absolute 
number of late-term abortions. The medical profession, furthermore, may find different and 
less shocking methods to abort the fetus in the second trimester, thereby accommodating 
legislative demand. The State’s interest in respect for life is advanced by the dialogue that 
better informs the political and legal systems, the medical profession, expectant mothers, 
and society as a whole of the consequences that follow from a decision to elect a late-term 
abortion.”).  
160. See Bach, supra note 16, at 668–69.  
161. McCormack v. Hiedeman, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1150 (D. Idaho 2013). 
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law.166 The court stated that “an undue burden exists, and therefore a 
provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a substan-
tial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus 
attains viability.”167 The court found that the purpose behind the en-
actment of Idaho’s twenty-week ban was not to inform or protect a 
woman’s health.168 Instead, the court found it was enacted with “the 
specific purpose of placing an insurmountable obstacle in the path of 
women seeking an abortion after twenty weeks, but before the fetus 
ha[d] attained viability.”169 Based on these findings the court concluded 
that the sole purpose behind the enactment of the law was to “narrow 
the scope of allowable previability abortions in the name of fetal 
pain.”170 Thus, the court held the purpose behind the law’s enactment 
made the law unconstitutional under the undue burden standard.171 
Moreover, the court also found the law unconstitutional because 
the effect of the law was to place a substantial obstacle in the path of 
women seeking an abortion before fetal viability.172 The court held that 
“an outright ban on abortions at or after twenty weeks’ gestation . . . 
place[d] not just a substantial obstacle, but an absolute obstacle, in the 
path of women seeking such abortions.”173 Thus, the court held the effect 
of Idaho’s twenty-week ban made the law unconstitutional under the 
undue burden standard.174 
B. Analysis of the District Court’s Holding in McCormack 
Although the district court’s holding striking down the Pain-
Capable Unborn Child Protection Act as unconstitutional appears cor-
rect under current abortion law precedent, the reasoning used by the 
court to reach that conclusion appears flawed for two reasons. First, the 
assertion by the court that there are only two permissible categories of 
abortion regulations before fetal viability175 is problematic. Second, the 
employment of the undue burden standard by the court to evaluate the 
twenty-week ban is wrong because the statute places an outright ban on 
some previability abortions. 
In regard to the first reason, the court’s assertion that only two 
permissible categories of previability regulations exist is unsound on 
                                                     
166. Id. at 1151.  
167. McCormack, 900 F. Supp. at 1149. 
168. Id. at 1150.  
169. Id. at 1151. 
170. Id. at 1150. 
171. Id. at 1151. 
172. Id. 
173. McCormack, 900 F. Supp. at 1151. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 1149. 
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two grounds. First, the Supreme Court itself has never stated that only 
two permissible categories of previability abortion regulations exist.176 
The Court has only stated that a state regulation on abortion cannot 
have the “purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path 
of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”177 Thus, the asser-
tion by the district court that there are only two permissible categories 
of previability regulations requires an inference to be drawn that since 
the Supreme Court has never upheld any other category of previability 
abortion regulation in the past it will never do so in the future. This 
conclusion is unsound given the fact that the Court has never put such a 
restriction on itself and has, in fact, been expanding the State’s interest 
in protecting fetal life so as to conceivably uphold more regulations on 
abortions furthering this interest in the future. 
Further, the court’s assertion that only two permissible categories 
of previability abortion regulations exist is flawed on the grounds that 
Idaho’s twenty-week ban and the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act are 
indistinguishable under the court’s apparent reasoning for placing the 
latter Act in the category of permissible regulations ensuring informed 
consent. A strong argument can be made that the two Acts should be 
treated in the same manner under the court’s categorization system. 
Similar to the argument described above for the Partial-Birth Abortion 
Ban Act, one can argue that Idaho’s twenty-week ban ensures informed 
consent because no woman fully informed of a fetus’s capability to feel 
pain at twenty weeks gestational age would elect to have an abortion 
after that time. Therefore, as Congress did when it enacted the Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban, Idaho was merely imposing a regulation to ensure 
the result that any well-informed woman would reach. Thus, the court’s 
reasoning for holding the Pain Capable Unborn Child Protection Act 
unconstitutional is flawed because the district court’s use of the catego-
rization system is unsound. 
In addition, the court’s reasoning for holding Idaho’s twenty-week 
ban unconstitutional is flawed because the court used the undue burden 
standard to evaluate the constitutionality of the law. In Casey, the Su-
                                                     
176. In discussing the undue burden standard, the Court in Casey set forth some 
guiding principles for courts to follow in applying the standard. The Court stated, “Some 
guiding principles should emerge. What is at stake is the woman’s right to make the ulti-
mate decision, not a right to be insulated from all others in doing so. Regulations which do no 
more than create a structural mechanism by which the State, or the parent or guardian of a 
minor, may express profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a 
substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose. Unless it has that effect 
on her right of choice, a state measure designed to persuade her to choose childbirth over 
abortion will be upheld if reasonably related to that goal. Regulations designed to foster the 
health of a woman seeking an abortion are valid if they do not constitute an undue burden.” 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877–78 (1992). Thus, the Court never 
laid down a hard and fast rule that only two permissible categories of previability regula-
tions exist.  
177. Id. at 877 (“A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that 
a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a 
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”).  
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preme Court held that “viability marks the earliest point [in time] at 
which the State’s interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to jus-
tify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions.”178 Further, the Court 
held that the State can regulate previability abortions so long as such 
regulations do not impose an undue burden on the woman’s right to 
choose.179 However, the undue burden standard is not applicable to Ida-
ho’s twenty-week ban. This is the case because the Pain-Capable Un-
born Child Protection Act bans all abortions beginning at twenty 
weeks180 and viability does not occur until roughly twenty-three or 
twenty-four weeks of pregnancy.181 Thus, the Act is a legislative ban on 
nontherapeutic abortions before viability and is simply unconstitutional 
on its face, rendering the undue burden standard inapplicable and the 
court’s reasoning for holding the twenty-week ban unconstitutional 
flawed.182 The Ninth Circuit Court used the same reasoning in Isaacson 
v. Horne, a ruling that came down ten weeks after McCormack, to hold 
Arizona’s twenty-week ban per se unconstitutional.183 
C. Isaacson v. Horne 
In Isaacson v. Horne the Ninth Circuit Court took up the constitu-
tionality of an Arizona statute banning abortions beginning at twenty 
weeks of pregnancy.184 The Arizona statute at issue in Isaacson was al-
most identical to the Idaho statute at issue in McCormack.185 The stated 
purpose of the law was to curtail the risks to a woman’s health associat-
ed with a late-term abortion and ban abortions starting at twenty weeks 
of pregnancy where strong medical evidence indicates that an unborn 
child feels pain during an abortion at that age of gestation.186 The Ari-
zona law reads in pertinent part: 
Except in a medical emergency, a person shall not perform, in-
duce or attempt to perform or induce an abortion unless the 
physician or the referring physician has first made a determina-
tion of the probable gestational age of the unborn child. In mak-
ing that determination, the physician or referring physician 
shall make any inquiries of the pregnant woman and perform or 
                                                     
178. Id. at 860. 
179. Id. at 876.  
180. McCormack, 900 F. Supp. 2d, at 1151. 
181. Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213, 1225 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
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182. See id. at 1225–26.  
183. Id. 
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185. See Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1217–18; McCormack, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1149. 
186. Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1218. 
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cause to be performed all medical examinations, imaging studies 
and tests as a reasonably prudent physician in the community, 
knowledgeable about the medical facts and conditions of both 
the woman and the unborn child involved, would consider neces-
sary to perform and consider in making an accurate diagnosis 
with respect to gestational age. 
Except in a medical emergency, a person shall not knowingly 
perform, induce or attempt to perform or induce an abortion on a 
pregnant woman if the probable gestational age of her unborn 
child has been determined to be at least twenty weeks.187 
 
In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit Court reversed a district court’s 
ruling holding the above cited law constitutional and instead held the 
law per se unconstitutional.188 The district court had found the law con-
stitutional under the undue burden standard as a permissible regula-
tion on previability abortions.189 However, the Ninth Circuit found the 
use of the undue burden standard faulty because the law placed a ban 
on some previability abortions.190 In reaching its holding, the court set 
out three main points regarding viability and the law. First, the court 
pointed out that the parties in the case agreed that no fetus was viable 
at twenty weeks gestational age.191 Second, the court found that as of 
now, based on medical evidence, viability usually does not occur until 
twenty-three or twenty-four weeks of pregnancy.192 Lastly, the court 
stated that Arizona’s law banned all abortions starting at twenty weeks 
of pregnancy unless a medical emergency existed that threatened the 
mother’s life or health.193 Thus, based on these findings, the court found 
Arizona’s twenty-week ban per se unconstitutional under Supreme 
Court precedent as it banned some previability abortions. In its opinion, 
the court reiterated the Supreme Court’s holding that the State’s inter-
est in potential life does not become compelling until viability,194 and 
stated the medical emergency exception in Arizona’s statute did not 
transform it into a permissible regulation on previability abortions.195 
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188. Isaacson, 716 F.3d at 1217, 1225–26. 
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D. Analysis of the Ninth Circuit’s Holding in Isaacson 
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning for holding Arizona’s twenty-week 
ban unconstitutional appears spot-on under current abortion law prece-
dent. As abortion law stands right now, bans on previability abortions 
are per se unconstitutional.196 The Court has stated repeatedly that the 
State’s interest in potential life does not become compelling enough to 
justify a ban on abortions until the point of viability.197 Although the 
district courts in Idaho and Arizona used Casey’s undue burden stand-
ard to evaluate the constitutionality of the twenty-week bans at issue in 
McCormack and Isaacson,198 it seems clear that the Ninth Circuit Court 
was correct in holding Arizona’s twenty-week ban unconstitutional on 
its face. Although it seems clear that the twenty-week bans being enact-
ed by the states are per se unconstitutional under current Supreme 
Court precedent, the question remains: in light of new medical evidence 
regarding fetal pain, should the Supreme Court revisit Roe’s central rule 
marking viability as the critical point in time at which the State’s inter-
est in potential life becomes compelling enough to warrant a ban on 
abortions, and replace it with fetal pain? 
PART IV: SHOULD THE SUPREME COURT REVISIT ROE V. 
WADE’S CENTRAL HOLDING MARKING VIABILITY AS THE 
CRITICAL POINT IN TIME AT WHICH THE STATE’S INTEREST IN 
POTENTIAL LIFE BECOMES COMPELLING ENOUGH TO 
WARRANT PROSCRIPTION OF ABORTION AND REPLACE IT WITH 
FETAL PAIN? 
A strong argument can be made that fetal pain, not fetal viability, 
should be the critical point in time at which the State’s interest in po-
tential life becomes compelling enough to warrant prohibitions on abor-
tion procedures. This is the case for four main reasons. First, fetal pain 
is a more workable point in time at which to deem the State’s interest in 
fetal life compelling because it is a more conclusive point.199 Second, re-
placing Roe’s central rule marking viability as the critical point with 
                                                     
196. “First is a recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion 
before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State. Before viability, 
the State’s interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposi-
tion of a substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective right to elect the procedure.” Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).  
197. See id.; see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007); Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113, 163–64 (1973), holding modified by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992).  
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fetal pain would not cause “serious inequity” to those who rely on abor-
tion.200 Third, over the last four decades, the Court has expanded the 
State’s interest in fetal life both in time and scope allowing state regula-
tion of previability abortions from the outset of pregnancy to preserve 
fetal life and ensure dignity and respect for human life.201 Allowing the 
State to ban abortions beginning at the time unborn children are capa-
ble of feeling pain is, thus, logical under this expansion of the State’s 
interest in fetal life.202 Finally, allowing the State to prohibit abortions 
beginning at the time unborn children have the capacity to feel pain is 
both relevant and justifiable.203 Thus, the Supreme Court should revisit 
its prior holding in Roe because a strong argument can be made that 
Roe’s central rule marking viability as the critical point should be re-
placed with fetal pain. 
Part A of this section of the article will examine the doctrine of 
stare decisis and the framework set out by the Court in Casey for evalu-
ating and overturning precedent. Part B will then address how the 
Court in Casey applied the framework to conclude that Roe should not 
be overturned. In Part C, the framework from Casey will be applied to 
Roe today, post Casey and Carhart, and the four factors discussed above 
will be evaluated in greater detail in addressing whether the Court 
should change the critical point from fetal viability to fetal pain. Part D 
will briefly conclude this section. 
A. Stare Decisis and the Framework for Re-Examining and Overturning 
Abortion Law Precedent 
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, the Supreme Court will not 
lightly overrule its prior holdings marking viability as the critical point 
in time where the State’s interest in fetal life becomes compelling 
enough to justify a prohibition on abortion.204 “The [Supreme] Court op-
erates as an institution, and the . . . Justices . . . operate within its insti-
tutional framework.”205 Within that institutional framework is the doc-
trine of stare decisis that the Court, to some degree, is bound by.206 The 
doctrine of stare decisis stands for the premise that judges should follow 
the same reasoning used in prior cases when deciding similar cases in 
the future.207 This means that “what [the Court] has done in the past, it 
will continue to do in the future.”208 
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In Casey, the Court explained that necessity requires the Court, to 
some extent, to follow the doctrine of stare decisis209 and specifically re-
jected the argument that it should overrule its prior holding in Roe an-
nouncing a woman’s constitutional right to obtain a previability abor-
tion.210 The Court stated: 
 
[W]hen this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is 
customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic 
considerations designed to test the consistency of overruling a 
prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the 
respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case.211 
 
With this in mind, the Court laid out a series of questions that it 
would evaluate in determining whether or not to overturn Roe. 212 The 
Court stated: 
[W]e may enquire whether Roe’s central rule has been found 
unworkable; whether the rule’s limitation on state power could 
be removed without serious inequity to those who have relied 
upon it or significant damage to the stability of the society gov-
erned by it; whether the law’s growth in the intervening years 
has left Roe’s central rule a doctrinal anachronism discounted by 
society; and whether Roe’s premises of fact have so far changed 
in the ensuing two decades as to render its central holding 
somehow irrelevant or unjustifiable in dealing with the issue it 
addressed.213 
Based on these inquiries, the Court declined to overrule the landmark 
case.214 
B. The Court’s Application of the Framework in Casey in Deciding Not 
to Overturn Roe 
In declining to overturn Roe, the Court used the framework dis-
cussed above.215 Under the framework the Court found that Roe’s cen-
tral premise had not been weakened by subsequent decisions and that 
                                                                                                                           
“a doctrine or policy of following rules or principles laid down in previous judicial decisions 
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the ruling in Roe was still supported by the doctrine and premises on 
which it was based.216 To reach this conclusion, the Court took up, in 
turn, each of the four questions set out in the framework.217 
First, the Court in Casey evaluated whether Roe’s central rule, that 
the State cannot proscribe previability abortions, was unworkable.218 
The Court answered this in the negative.219 In reaching that conclusion, 
the Court held that Roe’s central rule represented “a simple limitation 
beyond which a state law is unenforceable.”220 Based on that, the Court 
found that the required determination, that is, whether a law violates 
“the exercise of the choice guaranteed against government infringe-
ment” was “within judicial competence.”221 Thus, the Court in Casey 
found Roe’s central rule, which marked viability as the critical point, 
workable.222 
The second question the Court in Casey evaluated in deciding 
whether or not to overturn Roe’s central rule was “whether the rule’s 
limitation on state power could be removed without serious inequity to 
those who have relied upon it or significant damage to the stability of 
the society governed by it.”223 The Court also answered this question in 
the negative finding that overruling Roe and its central rule, marking 
viability as the critical point, would negatively affect individuals and 
society as a whole.224 In making that finding, the Court stated: 
[F]or two decades of economic and social developments, people 
have organized intimate relationships and made choices that de-
fine their views of themselves and their places in society, in reli-
ance on the availability of abortion in the event that contracep-
tion should fail. [Further,] [t]he ability of women to participate 
equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been fa-
cilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.225 
Thus, the Court found that Roe’s central rule should not be overruled 
because both individuals and society as a whole relied on a woman’s 
right to obtain an abortion.226 
The third question the Court looked at in Casey in determining if 
Roe should be overruled was “whether the law’s growth in the interven-
ing years ha[d] left Roe’s central rule a doctrinal anachronism discount-
ed by society . . . .”227 The Court broadly answered this question in the 
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negative, but found that Roe’s central rule undervalued the State’s in-
terest in potential life.228 The Court analyzed a woman’s right to obtain 
an abortion under the liberty prong of the 14th Amendment of the Con-
stitution and also under the theory of sui generis.229 The Court found 
that regardless of the theory used to protect a woman’s constitutional 
right to obtain an abortion, the right had been upheld by a majority of 
justices in the years between Roe and Casey.230 However, the Court also 
stated that if “the central holding in Roe was in error, that error would 
go . . . to the strength of the state interest in fetal protection, not the 
recognition afforded by the Constitution to the woman’s liberty.”231 
Thus, the Court found Roe’s central rule had not been discounted by the 
law’s growth in the years since Roe, but recognized that Roe’s central 
rule did not afford the State a great enough interest in protecting the 
life of the unborn child.232 In remedying this issue, the Court declined to 
outright overrule Roe, but tweaked its central rule by abandoning the 
trimester framework and adopting the undue burden standard affording 
the State a greater interest in potential life while continuing to uphold 
the woman’s constitutional right to obtain an abortion.233 
The final question the Court in Casey evaluated in determining if it 
should overrule Roe was “whether Roe’s premises of fact ha[d] so far 
changed in the ensuing two decades as to render its central holding 
somehow irrelevant or unjustifiable in dealing with the issue it ad-
dressed.”234 Again, the Court answered the question in the negative.235 
In evaluating this question, the Court looked at developments in medi-
cal technology since Roe.236 From 1973 to 1992, advances in medical 
technology had changed the point of viability from twenty-eight weeks of 
pregnancy to roughly twenty-three or twenty-four weeks of pregnan-
cy.237 Although the point of viability had changed, the Court concluded 
that such a change only went to “the scheme of time limits on the reali-
zation of competing interests . . . .”238 Thus, the Court concluded that 
“the divergences from the factual premises of 1973 ha[d] no bearing on 
the validity of Roe’s central holding, that viability marks the earliest 
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point at which the State’s interest in fetal life is constitutionally ade-
quate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions.”239 
Although the Court in Casey declined to overrule Roe and recog-
nized the importance of stare decisis in judicial jurisprudence, the Court 
did tweak Roe in a major way by rejecting the trimester framework and 
adopting the undue burden standard.240 In addition, the Court stated 
that “the rule of stare decisis is not an ‘[irrevocable] command’ and cer-
tainly it is not such in every constitutional case”241 and emphasized 
Roe’s under-appreciation for the State’s interest in potential life.242 
Thus, the Court left open the possibility of reevaluating Roe’s central 
rule at a future time and, if circumstances called for such action, once 
again tweaking the rule, or altogether overruling it if the four questions 
set out in the framework for overturning precedent were answered in 
the affirmative. 
C. Applying the Framework from Casey to Roe Today in Determining if 
the Court Should Change the Critical Point from Fetal Viability to Fetal 
Pain 
In light of new medical evidence indicating that unborn children 
are capable of feeling pain at twenty weeks, the circumstances may be 
right now for the Court to reevaluate Roe’s central rule marking viabil-
ity as the critical point. Twenty years have passed since the Court de-
clined to overturn Roe in Casey.243 Since that time, compelling new med-
ical evidence regarding fetal pain has emerged244 and the Court has 
greatly expanded the State’s interest in fetal life both in scope and 
time.245 In addition, numerous states like Idaho and Arizona have en-
acted “twenty-week bans,” statutes banning previability abortions246 
and courts are split on how to evaluate and rule on such laws.247 Thus, 
reevaluation of Roe’s central rule under the framework set out in Casey 
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is warranted and fetal pain instead of fetal viability should be deemed 
the critical point in time at which the State’s interest in potential life 
becomes compelling. 
In evaluating this argument under the framework laid out in Casey 
for overruling precedent, it is important to note that by changing the 
critical point from fetal viability to fetal pain, or by recognizing a second 
compelling State interest in fetal pain, the Court would not be required 
to completely overrule Roe. Rather, like in Casey, the Court could con-
tinue to uphold Roe’s central premise, that a woman has a constitutional 
right to choose abortion, while slightly tweaking the point in time at 
which the State can intervene on behalf of the unborn child by proscrib-
ing nontherapeutic abortions. 
i. Is Roe’s Central Rule Unworkable Today? 
Roe’s central rule may no longer be workable in light of differing 
court opinions regarding the constitutionality of the twenty-week bans 
being enacted by the states.248 Under the framework set out in Casey, 
the first question that must be evaluated in determining if Roe should 
be overruled is whether or not its central rule is unworkable.249 Roe’s 
central rule states that the State can prohibit post-viability abortions 
but can only regulate previability abortions.250 In Casey, the Court an-
swered the question of unworkability in the negative and held that via-
bility is “a simple limitation . . . within judicial competence.”251 Howev-
er, because at least three different courts have decided the constitution-
ality of the twenty-week bans differently under current Supreme Court 
precedent, viability may no longer be “a simple limitation . . . within ju-
dicial competence.”252 Thus, Roe’s central rule may no longer be worka-
ble. 
Roe’s central rule marking viability as the critical point is unwork-
able and beyond judicial competence for four main reasons: 1) viability 
                                                     
248. See McCormack v. Hiedeman, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1151 (D. Idaho 2013) (hold-
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Parenthood of Se. Pa.v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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252. McCormack, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1149–51 (holding Idaho’s “twenty week ban” 
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is a variable point,253 2) courts have trouble distinguishing abortion 
bans from abortion regulations under current precedent,254 3) the undue 
burden standard is amorphous,255 and 4) it is unclear whether regula-
tions can only permissibly be justified by preserving maternal health or 
ensuring informed consent.256 
First, viability is a variable point and changes from pregnancy to 
pregnancy.257 Because of this, there is no conclusive point in time at 
which viability occurs.258 Although a majority of specialists estimate 
that viability occurs somewhere between twenty-three and twenty-four 
weeks of pregnancy,259 disagreement among specialists continues.260 
Some specialists estimate viability occurs as early as twenty-two weeks 
of pregnancy while others estimate it to occur as late as twenty-six 
weeks of pregnancy.261 Thus, because there is no conclusive point in 
time at which viability occurs, the State “may not fix viability at a spe-
cific point in pregnancy” by enacting blanket laws banning abortions 
based on weeks of gestation.262 For that reason, it may be difficult for 
courts to evaluate if a law prohibits a previability abortion, which is un-
constitutional, or a post-viability abortion, which is constitutional. This 
makes Roe’s central rule, marking viability as the critical point, un-
workable. 
Second, under Supreme Court precedent, it is difficult for courts to 
distinguish between laws that ban previability abortions and laws that 
place regulations on such abortions.263 This is evidenced by the fact that 
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in McCormack the District Court held Idaho’s twenty-week ban uncon-
stitutional as an impermissible regulation on previability abortions.264 
However, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona 
held Arizona’s twenty-week ban, an almost identical statute, constitu-
tional as a permissible regulation on previability abortions.265 Moreover, 
in Isaacson, the Ninth Circuit Court overturned the Arizona District 
Court’s ruling and held the same statute per se unconstitutional as an 
impermissible ban on previability abortions.266 Thus, because courts 
have trouble distinguishing between bans on previability abortions and 
regulations on such abortions, Roe’s central rule is unworkable. 
Third, the undue burden standard is an indeterminate standard 
rendering viability an unworkable rule. The undue burden standard an-
nounced in Casey allows State regulation of previability abortions so 
long as such regulations do not unduly burden a woman’s right to 
choose.267 However, courts disagree about what constitutes an undue 
burden.268 In McCormack the District Court in Idaho used the undue 
burden standard in striking down Idaho’s twenty-week ban.269 The 
Court held that the law’s purpose and effect was to place an absolute 
obstacle in the path of women seeking abortions after twenty weeks of 
pregnancy, but prior to viability, and thus posed an undue burden.270 
However, the District Court in Arizona upheld Arizona’s twenty-week 
ban as constitutional under the undue burden standard.271 There, the 
court held that the medical exceptions to the law made it a permissible 
regulation on previability abortions.272 Further, the Ninth Circuit Court 
declined to even apply the undue burden standard to Arizona’s twenty-
week ban because the law was not a regulation subject to the undue 
burden standard.273 These cases show that the undue burden standard 
is not clearly defined and courts disagree on how to apply it to laws. 
Thus, viability under the undue burden standard is unworkable. 
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Lastly, Roe’s central rule is unworkable because Supreme Court 
precedent leaves unclear whether previability regulations can only per-
missibly be justified by preserving maternal health and ensuring in-
formed consent.274 In McCormack the District Court made the assertion 
that only two permissible categories of previability regulations exist: 
those to ensure a woman’s informed consent and those to protect mater-
nal health.275 Although the Supreme Court has never held that there 
are only two permissible categories of regulations,276 an examination of 
prior Supreme Court holdings suggests this could be the case—with the 
possible exception of Carhart—as the Court has yet to uphold any other 
type of previability regulation as constitutional.277 Thus, Roe’s central 
rule is unworkable because it is unclear if there are only two permissible 
categories of previability regulations. 
Because Roe’s central rule is unworkable, the Court could reevalu-
ate and replace it with a more workable standard such as fetal pain. If 
fetal pain became the new critical point, the central rule would be: the 
State may regulate abortions prior to twenty weeks of pregnancy and 
after that point may prohibit abortions. Fetal pain is a more workable 
point than fetal viability because it is a more conclusive point in time. 
Medical evidence shows that all unborn children are capable of feeling 
pain at twenty weeks gestational age,278 whereas, there is no conclusive 
point in time at which all unborn children become viable.279 Although a 
majority of specialists place viability somewhere between twenty-three 
and twenty-four weeks of pregnancy,280 a non-conclusive point in and of 
itself, continued disagreement among specialists shows that viability 
may occur anywhere from twenty-two weeks to twenty-six weeks of 
pregnancy.281 Thus, if fetal pain were the critical point, the State could 
enact blanket laws banning abortions at twenty weeks gestation making 
it easier for courts to assess the constitutionality of such laws because 
all laws banning abortions before twenty weeks would be unconstitu-
tional. Therefore, fetal pain is a more workable rule than fetal viability 
in determining when the State’s interest in fetal life is compelling 
enough to warrant a prohibition on abortion. 
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ii: Can Roe’s Central Rule Limiting State Power Be Removed without 
Serious Inequity to Those Who Have Relied Upon It or Significant 
Damage to the Stability of the Society Governed by It? 
The critical point could be changed from viability to fetal pain 
without serious inequity to those who rely upon the right to obtain an 
abortion because the Court in Casey already undermined reliance on the 
absolute right to obtain a first-trimester abortion. Further, reliance on 
the right to obtain a previability abortion would not be seriously dis-
turbed by slightly tweaking the critical point in time at which the 
State’s interest in fetal life becomes compelling. Under the framework 
set out in Casey for evaluating abortion law precedent, the second ques-
tion that must be addressed is whether or not Roe’s central rule limiting 
state power can be removed without serious inequity to those who have 
relied upon it or significant damage to the stability of the society gov-
erned by it.282 In Casey, the Court found that Roe’s central rule could 
not be removed without serious inequity because for two decades indi-
viduals and society had relied on a woman’s right to obtain an abortion 
“in the event that contraception should fail.”283 However, although the 
Court declined to overrule Roe for fear of causing inequity to those who 
relied on abortion, the Court’s opinion itself greatly undermined reliance 
on the right of women to obtain a first-trimester abortion.284 Further, 
reliance on abortion “in the event that contraception should fail”285 
would not seriously be disturbed by changing the critical point from fe-
tal viability to fetal pain.286 Thus, Roe’s central rule could be tweaked 
without serious inequity to those who rely on abortion or significant 
damage to the stability of society. 
After the Court’s opinion in Casey, abortion law precedent was 
dramatically changed and reliance on Roe was dramatically under-
mined.287 As discussed in Part II.B of this article, the adoption of the 
undue burden standard in Casey greatly expanded the State’s interest 
in potential life.288 With that expansion, the State gained greater power 
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to regulate abortions and women lost the absolute right to obtain a first-
trimester abortion.289 As Chief Justice Rehnquist stated in his dissent in 
Casey, “Roe continues to exist [today], but only in the way a storefront 
on a western movie set exists: a mere facade to give the illusion of reali-
ty.”290 Thus, Casey greatly undermined reliance on the absolute right to 
obtain an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy.291 
Because Casey undermined reliance on a woman’s absolute right to 
obtain a first-trimester previability abortion, apparently without trig-
gering the serious inequities warned of in the same case, it follows that 
changing the critical point from fetal viability to fetal pain would not 
dramatically disrupt reliance on the ability to obtain a previability abor-
tion. Today, as medical evidence indicates, viability occurs at roughly 
twenty-three or twenty-four weeks of pregnancy.292 Further, medical 
evidence indicates that unborn children are capable of feeling pain be-
ginning at twenty weeks gestational age.293 Thus, if the critical point 
was changed from viability to fetal pain, a woman would only lose three 
or four weeks in the second trimester of pregnancy in which she could 
have relied on abortion under Roe’s central rule that she could no longer 
rely on under the new rule. As the Court said in Casey, “a woman who 
fails to act before viability has consented to the State’s intervention on 
behalf of the developing child” and after that point cannot rely on abor-
tion.294 The same can be said if the critical point were changed to fetal 
pain. A woman who fails to act before the twentieth week of pregnancy 
has consented to the State’s intervention on behalf of the developing 
child and can no longer rely on the right to obtain an abortion. Thus, 
changing the critical point to fetal pain would not cause serious inequity 
to those who rely on abortion since Casey already undermined the abso-
lute right to obtain a first-trimester abortion, and changing the critical 
point would only take away three or four weeks of reliance late in the 
second trimester. 
Further, reliance on abortion in the event contraception failed 
would not seriously be disturbed by changing the critical point from fe-
tal viability to fetal pain because such reliance does not apply in the 
late-term abortion setting. In Isaacson, the physician plaintiffs asserted 
that patients “seek previability [late-term] abortions for . . . reasons 
[such as the] continuation of the pregnancy pos[ing] a threat to their 
health, . . . the fetus has been diagnosed with a medical condition or 
anomaly, or that they are losing their pregnancy.”295 This indicates that 
although women rely on abortions for a variety of reasons early on in 
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pregnancies, such as failed contraception, as pregnancies progress into 
the second and third trimester, the reasons for seeking late-term abor-
tions narrow. At that point in pregnancy, there is usually a medical rea-
son—rather than a failure of contraception—behind a woman wanting 
to obtain an abortion.296 Thus, the reliance on abortion spoke of in Ca-
sey, that is, individuals’ reliance “on the availability of abortion in the 
event that contraception should fail,” does not apply in the late-term 
abortion setting.297 
Further, for a woman who relies on a late-term previability abor-
tion in the event that an unforeseen medical issue arises with her or her 
fetus, reliance on obtaining such an abortion would not be disturbed by 
changing the critical point to fetal pain if exceptions were put into the 
twenty-week bans accommodating such medical reasons. Although the 
current twenty-week bans have only narrow medical exceptions that do 
not cover all the medical reasons for seeking a late-term previability 
abortion, like fetal anomaly, the Supreme Court could require such ex-
ceptions be written into the laws. This would allow the State to assert 
its interest in protecting potential life from the time at which unborn 
children are capable of feeling pain, while at the same time avoiding 
inequity to those who do rely on late term abortions. 
Thus, because Casey already substantially undermined the ability 
of women to obtain a previability first-trimester abortion298 and because 
most women seeking abortion after twenty weeks gestational age do so 
for a medical reason and not because contraception failed,299 changing 
the critical point from viability to fetal pain would not greatly affect re-
liance on abortion. Further, broadening the existing medical exceptions 
to the twenty-week bans would ensure that reliance on late term abor-
tions for medical reasons would not be affected. Thus, changing the crit-
ical point in time in which the State’s interest in fetal life becomes com-
pelling to fetal pain would not cause inequity to those who rely on abor-
tion. 
iii. Has the Law’s Growth in the Intervening Years since Roe Left Roe’s 
Central Rule a Doctrinal Anachronism Discounted by Society? 
In the forty years since Roe was decided, the Court’s opinions in 
Casey and Carhart have left Roe’s central rule a hollow principle by ex-
panding the State’s interest in fetal life both in scope and time.300 Under 
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the framework set out in Casey for reevaluating prior precedent, the 
third question that must be looked at is “whether the law’s growth in 
the intervening years has left Roe’s central rule a doctrinal anachronism 
discounted by society.”301 In Casey, the Court broadly answered this 
question in the negative stating that, over the years, a majority of jus-
tices had upheld the right of women to choose abortion.302 However, the 
Court also stated that Roe’s central holding erred in not affording the 
State a greater interest in fetal protection.303 
To remedy the error, the Court expanded the State’s interest in fe-
tal life in time by adopting the undue burden standard.304 The undue 
burden standard announced by the Court “left no doubt that the Court 
had struck a new balance between the state’s interest in protecting life 
and the woman’s right to choose.”305 The new standard “obliterated the 
absolute right to a first-trimester abortion established in Roe and re-
placed it with an ‘inherently nebulous standard’ that provides states 
with a high degree of regulatory flexibility.”306 Thus, after Casey, the 
State is permitted to regulate abortion procedures to promote its inter-
est in potential life throughout pregnancy307 whereas, under Roe, the 
only regulations permitted were during the second trimester to protect 
maternal health.308 Casey thus changed abortion law by expanding the 
State’s interest in protecting fetal life in time.309 
Fifteen years after Casey, the Court once again expanded the 
State’s interest in potential life, this time in scope.310 In Carhart, the 
Court expanded the State’s interest in potential life to encompass not 
just preservation of life but also to encompass dignity and respect for 
human life.311 The opinion:  
 
[marked] a sharp turn away from framing the abortion debate in 
terms of women’s rights and empowerment. In holding that the 
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 d[id] not pose an undue 
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burden on a woman’s constitutional right to an abortion, the 
court explicitly value[d] protecting fetal rights over women’s 
rights.312 
  
Thus, Carhart expanded the State’s interest in potential life in scope by 
allowing regulations that protect and promote dignity and respect for 
human life.313 
Thus, because the Court has greatly expanded the State’s interest 
in protecting fetal life in both scope and time, Roe’s central rule, mark-
ing viability as the critical point in time at which the State’s interest in 
potential life becomes compelling, has become a hollow principle. This is 
so because the State cannot adequately protect potential life prior to 
viability through regulation alone.314 At twenty weeks gestational age, a 
point in time prior to viability, unborn children are capable of feeling 
pain.315 Although substantial medical evidence supports this assertion, 
state regulations banning abortions at that time are likely per se uncon-
stitutional under Roe’s central rule.316 This seems at odds with what the 
Court said in both Casey and Carhart when it expanded the State’s in-
terest in potential life in scope and time because such regulations pro-
tect and promote dignity and respect for human life. Thus, Roe’s central 
rule, marking viability as the critical point, has become a doctrinal 
anachronism and should be replaced with fetal pain. 
iv. Has Roe’s Premises of Fact so Far Changed in the Ensuing Four 
Decades as to Render Its Central Holding Somehow Irrelevant or 
Unjustifiable in Dealing with the Issue It Addressed? 
Roe’s central holding is irrelevant because a fetus that is deemed 
viable does not necessarily have a realistic chance of survival outside 
the womb.317 Further, new medical evidence indicating that unborn 
children are capable of feeling pain at twenty weeks of pregnancy has 
surfaced rendering Roe’s central rule unjustifiable.318 The final question 
that must be evaluated in determining whether or not to overrule Roe is 
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“whether Roe’s premises of fact have so far changed in the ensuing 
[four] decades as to render its central holding somehow irrelevant or 
unjustifiable in dealing with the issue it addressed.”319 In Casey, the 
Court answered this question in the negative because, although the 
point of viability had changed in the two decades between Roe and Ca-
sey, such a change only went to “the scheme of time limits on the reali-
zation of competing interests.”320 However, when a fetus is deemed via-
ble medical evidence indicates that the chances of survival outside the 
womb are slim,321 leaving Roe’s central rule, marking viability as the 
critical point, irrelevant. Further, new medical evidence has come to 
light since the Court’s holdings in Roe and Casey showing unborn chil-
dren can feel pain beginning at twenty weeks gestational age.322 This 
new evidence renders Roe’s central rule unjustifiable.323 Thus, the criti-
cal point should be changed from viability to fetal pain as Roe’s central 
rule is no longer relevant or justifiable in light of new medical evidence. 
Viability is an irrelevant point in time at which to deem the State’s 
interest in potential life compelling because the “realistic possibility” of 
survival for children born at twenty-three and twenty-four weeks of 
pregnancy, the generally accepted range at which viability occurs, in 
fact reflects a fairly slim chance of survival.324 Because survival outside 
the womb is unlikely at the point of viability, bans on abortions begin-
ning at viability lack both “logical and biological justifications” as viabil-
ity is less meaningful than many people believe.325 Although Justice 
Blackmun held in Roe that the point of viability is the critical point at 
which a State’s interest in potential life becomes compelling because at 
that point there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a 
life outside the womb, and thus state regulation after viability has both 
“logical and biological justifications,”326 there is medical evidence sug-
gesting that the chances of survival at twenty-three or twenty-four 
weeks gestational age is slim.327 Physicians estimate less than a 10% 
chance of survival for children born at twenty-two weeks, a 10%–35% 
chance of survival for children born at twenty-three weeks, and a 40%–
70% chance of survival for children born at twenty-four weeks gesta-
tional age.328 This evidence substantially undermines Justice 
Blackmun’s reasoning for marking viability as the critical point. This is 
so because there is not necessarily a realistic possibility of maintaining 
and nourishing a life outside the womb for children born at the point of 
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viability as evidenced by the statistics. Thus, there is no logical or bio-
logical justification for marking viability as the critical point because 
viability is not a watershed point in time at which existence outside the 
womb becomes probable rendering Roe’s central rule irrelevant. 
Moreover, Roe’s central rule is unjustifiable in light of new medical 
evidence showing unborn children are capable of feeling pain at twenty 
weeks of pregnancy,329 a point in time prior to viability.330 When Roe 
was decided in 1973, no medical evidence was available showing that 
unborn children can feel pain beginning at twenty weeks gestational 
age.331 Although such evidence had not come to light until recently, sev-
eral Justices over the years have stated that the State would in fact 
have an interest in intervening on behalf of the unborn child at the time 
the child developed the capacity to feel pain if such medical evidence 
ever came to light.332 In 1986, Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion 
in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 
argued that “the reason the Constitution forbids the state from restrict-
ing abortion is that the unborn child cannot feel pain.”333 He stated: 
I should think it obvious that the State’s interest in the protec-
tion of an embryo – even if that interest is defined as “protecting 
those who will be citizens,” - increases progressively and dra-
matically as the organism’s capacity to feel pain, to experience 
pleasure, to survive, and to react to its surroundings increases 
day by day. The development of a fetus, and pregnancy itself, 
are not static conditions, and the assertion that the govern-
ment’s interest is static simply ignores this reality.334 
Although in 1986 “Justice Stevens assumed that the unborn would 
not feel pain until late in pregnancy, [he] nonetheless . . . argued that 
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the State has the progressive right to intervene as the unborn developed 
the capacity to feel pain.”335 Further, in 1989, other Justices who sup-
ported a woman’s constitutional right to obtain an abortion including 
Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmun, the Justice 
who authored Roe, all concurred with Justice Stevens’ 1986 assessment 
that if and when a fetus developed the capacity to feel pain, the State 
would have the right to intervene if it so chose.336 
Thus, now that medical evidence is available indicating that in fact 
a fetus is capable of feeling pain beginning at twenty weeks gestational 
age,337 Roe’s central rule, marking viability as the critical point at which 
the State’s interest in potential life is compelling enough to ban abor-
tions, is unjustifiable. This is the case because abortion procedures tak-
ing place between twenty weeks gestational age, the time at which a 
fetus has the capacity to feel pain, and viability subject the unborn to a 
painful demise.338 In light of this new medical evidence it seems several 
Justices would concur that Roe’s central rule has become unjustifiable. 
Thus, because Roe’s central holding has been rendered irrelevant 
and unjustifiable in light of new medical evidence indicating that at via-
bility there is not a realistic chance of survival outside the womb339 and 
that unborn child have the capacity to feel pain at twenty weeks of 
pregnancy,340 the critical point should be changed to fetal pain. Replac-
ing viability with fetal pain has both logical and biological justifications 
because it would prevent unborn children from being subjected to pain-
ful abortion procedures; therefore, fetal pain is a relevant point in time 
at which to deem the State’s interest in potential life compelling. Simi-
larly, fetal pain is a justifiable point in time at which to hold the State’s 
interest in fetal life compelling because intervention on behalf of the 
unborn child at that point protects him or her from a painful end. Thus, 
because Roe’s central rule is no longer relevant or justifiable and be-
cause a central rule holding fetal pain as the critical point would be both 
relevant and justifiable, viability should be replaced with fetal pain as 
the compelling point. 
D. Conclusion 
Fetal pain, not fetal viability, should be the critical point in time at 
which the State’s interest in potential life is deemed compelling so as to 
warrant prohibitions on abortions and thus the Supreme Court should 
revisit Roe’s central rule. Under the test set out in Casey for revisiting 
prior precedent,341 Roe’s central rule should be tweaked for four reasons. 
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First, viability is no longer a workable point in time at which to deem 
the State’s interest compelling.342 Second, the central rule marking via-
bility as the critical point could be tweaked without serious inequity to 
those who rely on the right to abortion.343 Third, under the Court’s ex-
panded view of the State’s interest in fetal life, prohibiting State bans 
on abortion beginning at twenty weeks gestational age, the time unborn 
children become capable of feeling pain, is not logical.344 Finally, in light 
of new medical evidence, viability is an irrelevant and unjustifiable 
point in time at which to deem the State’s interest compelling.345 Thus, 
the Supreme Court should revisit Roe’s central rule and replace it with 
fetal pain, a more workable, logical, relevant, and justifiable point in 
time at which to deem the State’s interest in potential life compelling. 
PART V: CONCLUSION 
“[V]iability marks the earliest point at which the State’s interest in 
fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on non-
therapeutic abortion.”346 This central rule announced in Roe is in jeop-
ardy in light of new medical evidence indicating that an unborn child 
can feel pain at a point in time prior to viability.347 Roe has always con-
tained the seeds of its demise by relying on a state of medical 
knowledge—rather than law, morality, or philosophy—that was bound 
to change.348 The latest assault on Roe that is represented by these 
twenty-week bans, which rely heavily on new medical knowledge,349 
may very well succeed in diminishing Roe even further. 
Shea Leigh Line 
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